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IS THE AMERICAN DREAM EVERYONE
ELSE'S NIGHTMARE?
Emily Marr*
THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY. By
Ayelet Shachar. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press. 2009.
Pp. xiii, 273. $39.95.
INTRODUCTION
The American Dream is a trope with global reach.1 Although the "city
upon a hill"2 may have lost some of its luster in recent years, the idea that
America is a country where citizens can rise above "the fortuitous circum-
stances of birth or position"4 largely continues to resonate.' Professor Ayelet
Shachar's6 provocative new book, however, suggests otherwise.
In The Birthright Lottery, Shachar condemns birthright citizenship laws
as a feudal anachronism analogous to an inherited-property regime. For her,
birthright citizenship in a prosperous nation confers a morally arbitrary
windfall that determines life opportunities (pp. 4-7). Shachar further argues
that in a world of material inequalities, the winners of the "birthright lot-
tery" live large at the losers' expense (pp. 10-11, 22, 70, 98), often with
deadly results (pp. 12, 105).
Shachar's arguments, if embraced, profoundly undermine both the
feasibility and the desirability of the American Dream. If birthright
* J.D. Candidate, May 2011. I would like to thank my book notice editor, Dave Fautsch, as
well as Howard Kaplan, Ray Mangum, Bryn Pallesen, Sarah St.Vincent, and Matthew Talley for
their helpful feedback.
1. Professor Shachar's introduction, which recounts the story of five men from the Dominican
Republic risking life and limb to make it into America, offers an illustrative example. See pp. 1-2.
2. John Winthrop, City upon a Hill (1630), available at http://www.mtholyoke.edulacad/
intrel/winthrop.htm (altered).
3. JOHN E. SCHWARZ, ILLUSIONS OF OPPORTUNITY: THE AMERICAN DREAM IN QUESTION
(1997).
4. JAMES TRUSLOw ADAMS, THE Epic OF AMERICA 404 (1931).
5. See pp. 1-2.
6. Professor of Law, University of Toronto.
7. While Shachar's theoretical analysis is directed at a global audience, her mandate for
change is aimed primarily at affluent countries and the vast majority of her examples are specific to
the United States. See, e.g., pp. 31-32, 39-41, 58, 63-64, 80-83, 116-19, 122-23, 128-130,
1163
Michigan Law Review
citizenship is akin to entailed property, it is impossible to meaningfully
exercise the agency embodied in the American Dream. And if birthright
citizenship really is a zero-sum game, anybody living the American Dream
is necessarily responsible for somebody else's nightmare.
Shachar offers two remedies. First, she proposes a redistribution of op-
portunity on a global scale through a "birthright privilege levy" on
prosperous nations (p. 96). Second, she advocates the rejection of the birth-
right citizenship regime in favor of a "jus nexi" approach where citizenship
is based on a "genuine connection" to a sovereign (p. 164).
This Notice commends Shachar's contribution to the well-trod citizen-
ship debate, but argues that both her indictment of birthright citizenship and
her proposed solutions ultimately fall short. Part I situates The Birthright
Lottery in the context of the literature and celebrates its contributions. Part II
challenges Shachar's citizenship-as-entailed-property analogy, which she
presents as the foundation for her analysis (p. 3). Part III considers
Shachar's two proposals for citizenship reform. A consideration of The
Birthright Lottery in the context of the American Dream concludes.
I. SHACHAR'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO
THE CITIZENSHIP DEBATE
Shachar describes her book as a "comprehensive and iconoclastic" cri-
tique of worldwide birthright citizenship laws (p. xi). This grandiose
characterization is fitting: her multidisciplinary analysis covers enormous
intellectual territory with impressive originality.
This is no small accomplishment. Citizenship is one of the most hack-
neyed topics in both the academic and political arenas, and Shachar
manages to make contributions in both realms. In the academic context, she
engages three bodies of literature: "[C]itizenship studies in contemporary
political and legal scholarship, global inequality debates, and sociological
accounts of the demise of borders in the context of post-national theorizing"
(p. 13). Although her work is informed by these writings, she transcends each
of the genres by "juxtaposing these different lines of inquiry" and "high-
light[ing] the paucity of attention paid to birthright membership" (p. 14).
Shachar also addresses the citizenship debates in popular political dis-
course. Although "the topic of immigration nowadays attracts considerable
attention," immigrants comprise less than 3 percent of the global population
(p. 11). Rather than follow "the typical strategy" of "focus[ing] almost exclu-
sively on the situation of nonmembers," Shachar argues that "the basis for
entitlement of those who 'naturally' belong must also be examined" (p. 6). By
adopting an analytical framework that "shift[s] our gaze from the immigrant
to the citizen" (p. 7), Shachar exposes citizenship as a legal construct that
143-44, 155. Given Schachar's emphasis on the United States, this Notice considers the implica-
tions of The Birthright Lottery in that context.
8. In addition to rooting her book in a multitude of intellectual traditions, Shachar also




shapes the polity from the inside-out, and not just the outside-in. This is sig-
nificant because the status of 97 percent of the world's population-those
who keep their citizenship assigned at birth-is typically ignored in citizen-
ship debates (p. 11).
By thoroughly examining who belongs in a polity and why, The Birthright
Lottery earns Shachar's "iconoclastic" label (p. xxi). As she explains, the cur-
rent citizenship debate obscures "the presumed naturalness of birth-based
membership" (p. 26). The perceived naturalness of birthright citizenship is at
least partly responsible for exclusionary anti-immigrant rhetoric: citizens rou-
tinely invoke their status with a striking sense of moral superiority. In this
context, even the simple reminder that there is "nothing apolitical or neutral
about these birthright regimes" is powerful (p. 10). Shachar's book exposes
the reality that birthright citizens enjoy the spoils of the birthright lottery only
because of morally arbitrary legal constructs. In doing so, she makes possible
a new kind of conversation about citizenship. Given the centrality of citizen-
ship-in terms of both global politics and individual identity-this alone
makes the book worth reading.
II. CITIZENSHIP AS INHERITED PROPERTY
Shachar's citizenship-as-inherited-property analogy permeates the entire
book. For her, the analogy "creates a space in which to explore membership
entitlement in the broader context of today's urgent debates about global
justice and the distribution of opportunity."9 This Part argues that while the
analogy is rhetorically powerful, it is ultimately unpersuasive.
A. The Analogy
Shachar employs her citizenship-as-inherited-property analogy to
identify "surprising commonalities in both form and function between . ..
antiquated approaches to property transmission and present-day birthright
principles that regulate access to bounded membership" (p. 23). The
antiquated approach to property that Shachar condemns is the "long
discredited institution of the fee tail" (p. 38). Its function, she explains, was
to create a "legal means of restricting future succession of property to the
descendants of a designated person" (p. 38). Shachar argues that birthright
citizenship similarly takes the form of an intergenerational wealth transfer
(pp. 24-27) that is itself a valuable form of property (pp. 33-38). For
Shachar, the function of birthright citizenship is to "advantag[e] those who
have access to the inherited privilege of membership, while disadvantaging
those who do not" (p. 10). Once the commonalities between entailed
property and birthright citizenship are revealed, Shachar concludes, the
analogy should be self-evident (p. 10).
Shachar grounds the similarities between entailed property and birth-
right citizenship in a historical exploration of the early common-law
9. P. 3; see also p. 43.
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mechanisms of entailed estates (pp. 38-43). She notes that while "the legal
institution of entail ... migrated to North America with the English colo-
nists .... [i]t should come as no surprise that this aristocratic method for
preserving land in the sole dominion of certain families ... sparked the ire
of American revolutionary reformers" (p. 39). Americans ultimately re-
jected'o this "feudal encrustation[]" (p. 39), she explains, for three primary
reasons (pp. 39-41). First, it created an aristocratic class in perpetuity by
"guarantee[ing] entitlement to successive descendants simply by virtue of
their status" without imposing any criteria upon the recipient of the wealth
transfer (p. 40). Second, because "heirs of such families knew that they
could not be cut off from the chain of birthright transmission ... the repub-
lican concern was that they would become disobedient and socially
unproductive members of the polity" (p. 40). Finally, there was an efficiency
concern: "[T]hose who were guaranteed wealth as a matter of birthright ...
had little incentive to maximize the value of their estates" (p. 40).
After sketching out the rationales underpinning the United States' rejec-
tion of entailed property, Shachar concludes that birthright citizenship
principles in our modem society should seem incongruous when juxtaposed
against those of entailed property. She observes: "Whereas the archaic insti-
tution of the hereditary transfer of entailed estates has been discredited in
the realm of property, in the conferral of citizenship we still find a structure
that strongly resembles it" (p. 41). Birthright citizenship is a "striking ex-
ception to the modem trend away from ascribed status" and demands a
"coherent explanation" to this "puzzling" aberration (p. 42).
B. A Critique of the Analogy
The most coherent resolution to Shachar's dilemma is also the simplest:
birthright citizenship has persisted despite the demise of the entailed prop-
erty regime because birthright citizenship and entailed property are very
different. Although the mechanism of transmission for both institutions in-
volve superficially similar legal constructs," none of the animating
principles that Shachar identifies as reasons for rejecting entailed property
apply to the essence of birthright citizenship. Toward that end, Shachar's
own discussion of citizenship undercuts her analogy.
Shachar discusses citizenship at length in two sections designed to'tee
up her analogy (pp. 27-38). In the first section, "Property Theory: Some
Key Distinctions," Shachar establishes citizenship as a form of "new prop-
erty" (p. 29), which is "[u]nlike traditional forms of wealth ... held as
private property" because its value "derive[s] specifically by holding a legal
status that is dispensed by the state alone" (pp. 29-30). As such, Shachar
10. Shachar's language here, and elsewhere in the book, pp. 39-43, suggests that the fee tail
is a complete vestige of the past. Although the fee tail is rare, it is not yet extinct: some incarnations
of the fee tail remain in force in four states (Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island).
See DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY, 200-01 (7th ed. 2010).
11. See infra Section I.C.
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endorses a "broad (or 'trusteeship') conception of property," where prop-
erty forms "part of a web of social and political relations, wherein people
depend upon others 'not only to thrive but even just to survive'" (p. 30).
Understood this way, citizenship "provides each right-holder with a con-
crete and enforceable claim to participate in the governance of the
commonwealth, to share its burdens, and ideally, attain a threshold-level
of well-being" (p. 33).
In the second section, "Property and Citizenship: Several Analogous
Functions," Shachar explores the "gate-keeping" and the "opportunity-
enhancing" functions of citizenship vis-4-vis property (pp. 33-38). She
observes that both citizenship and property serve "gate-keeping" functions
that "protect the interests of those designated as legitimate title bearers,
while imposing severe legal sanctions against those who are perceived ... as
unauthorized entrants who breach them" (p. 34). The "opportunity-
enhancing" function of citizenship, "[l]ike other types of property. . . allows
its possessor to exercise freedom and autonomy through what is legally his
or hers and to protect their rights against the world" (p. 35).
Both of these sections frame citizenship as strikingly different from the
fee tail. First, although both entailed property and birthright citizenship in-
volve a transmission, only entailed property is a form of intergenerational
wealth transfer. Parents do not relinquish their citizenship rights to their
children; a new citizenship title is created at birth. In contrast, entailed prop-
erty is transferred only upon the owner's death; unlike citizenship,
Blackacre is a finite resource. Second, unlike entailed property, citizenship
is interactive. A central part of citizenship is "the core democratic right of
equal participation in collective decision-making processes" (pp. 32-33).
Citizenship derives its value from being communally generated (p. 30), and
citizens are duty-bound to serve as "equal partners in the common enterprise
of governing the commonweal" (p. 32). Further, the contours of citizenship
evolve through continuous negotiation.12
Understood this way, citizenship simply is not analogous to the fee tail.
Whereas the fee tail confers a static inheritance, citizenship is a dynamic
process with reciprocal duties and obligations. Consequently, Shachar's anal-
ogy to the fee tail-premised on the point that the fee tail produces a lazy
aristocratic class without any incentive to maximize wealth-is inapposite.
However, even assuming that the fee tail is akin to birthright citizenship,
it does not follow that birthright citizenship should rejected. Although
American law largely rejected the fee tail, other means of maintaining inter-
generational wealth remain prevalent. For example, future interests, trusts,
and wills all empower individuals to devise their personal property to their
descendants." Moreover, when a person dies intestate, all states provide that
12. See, e.g., p. 41; Garrett Epps, The Undiscovered Country: Northern Views of the De-
feated South and the Political Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS.
L. REV. 411 (2004); Natalie Smith, Developments in the Legislative Branch: Bill Challenges Birth-
right Citizenship, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 325 (2006).
13. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 10, at 195 ("The fee tail has been replaced by
the life estate as a device for controlling inheritance."); Ronald Chester, Is the Right to Devise
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the property first goes to the spouse and surviving descendants.14 As these
examples demonstrate, the automatic mechanism of property transmission is
alive and well; it is only the fee tail that is the problem. As such, the fee
tail's demise does not make it incongruous to retain birthright citizenship.
As Shachar herself notes in a different context, "the 'correct regulative
principle' for ... distribution . . . 'depends on the nature of that thing [dis-
tributed].' "'. Because the nature of birthright citizenship and entailed
property are different, it is unsurprising that the legal system has embraced
one and rejected the other. While Shachar occasionally qualifies her point by
referring to it as a "conceptual" project (p. 3) that compares entities that are
"largely analogous," 6 she never affirmatively explores how her analogy is
inexact. Given her definition of citizenship, which produces a noticeable
tension with her analogy, this is a surprising oversight.
C. A Problem of Scope
The natural interpretation of Shachar's analogy is that she views citizen-
ship as a form of inherited property." Indeed, the title of Chapter One,
"Reconceptualizing Membership: Citizenship as Inherited Property," would
appear to foreclose other interpretations (p. 21). Shachar, however, does not
define her terms and fails to use consistent language to describe her analogy.
As a result, the precise scope of her project remains unclear even after close
analysis. For that reason, it is worth noting two other possible interpretations
of her analogy's intended scope.
First, Shachar's analogy might be limited to the transfer mechanism of
birthright citizenship (pp. 2, 3, 23, 38, 42). This interpretation offers the
closest fit between birthright citizenship and entailed property. Like the fee
tail, birthright citizenship is automatically transmitted in perpetuity to its
recipients.
Alternatively, it is possible that Shachar views the automatic transmis-
sion mechanism of birthright citizenship and the lived experience of
birthright citizenship itself as interchangeable (pp. 4, 36, 96). Under this
reading, Shachar's point would be that the entire experience of citizenship in
the birthright citizenship regime is irrevocably tainted by its transfer mecha-
nism. Although she never makes this argument directly, Shachar endorses it
implicitly when she argues that it is the "starting point" that counts in evalu-
ating citizenship's enabling functions (p. 36). Additionally, she occasionally
discusses the transfer of citizenship as if it is interchangeable with citizen-
ship itself. For example, her title for the section where she lays out her
Property Constitutionally Protected?-The Strange Case of Hodel v. Irving, 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 1195
(1995); Laura E. Cunningham, The Hazards of Tinkering with the Common Law of Future Interests:
The California Experience, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 667 (1997).
14. DUKEMINIER et al., supra note 10, at 195.
15. P. 170 (quoting JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 25 (1970)).
16. P. 42. At other points, she offers additional qualifying terms, such as when she says that
birthright citizenship "closely resembles," p. 38, and "strongly resembles:' p. 40, the fee tail.
17. See pp. 3, 13, 24, 43.
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analogy is "Entailed Property and Birthright Citizenship: Analogous Trans-
missions?" (p. 38). In addition, she defines the birthright privilege tax as a
levy "on the transfer of political membership" and then later in the same
paragraph explains the tax as a "levy on inherited citizenship" (p. 96; em-
phasis added).
These readings of the analogy are no less problematic. If Shachar in-
tended to limit the scope of her point to transfer mechanisms, then her
analogy is reasonable but superficial. That is, while it is accurate that both
birthright citizenship and entrusted property are automatically transferred,
that similarity reveals little, if anything, about the essence of either.'8 If,
however, Shachar views the transfer of citizenship as interchangeable with
the experience of citizenship, then she has created an unacceptable tension
between her analogy and her discussion of citizenship (pp. 27-38). As dis-
cussed in Section IH.B, the nature of the right being conveyed in the fee tail
context is very different from birthright citizenship. The fee tail provides
unmitigated access to a plot of land that remains the same throughout the
ages. Citizenship, by contrast, provides access to an opportunity that re-
quires participation and reciprocal obligations in order for it to have
meaningful value. Blackacre will always be Blackacre, but citizenship
changes via a process of continuous negotiation. Consequently, an analogy
linking birthright citizenship to the fee tail solely because of its transfer me-
chanism ultimately rings hollow, as does an analogy that conflates the
transmission mechanism of a thing with the thing itself.
III. Two REMEDIES BUT ZERO SOLUTIONS
Shachar offers two alternatives to the status quo birthright citizenship
paradigm: a birthright levy and a jus nexi approach to citizenship. Part III
critiques both of Shachar's proposals.
A. The Birthright Levy
As Shachar explains it, the birthright levy would tax wealthy countries
for the privileges of retaining birthright citizenship (p. 86). In doing so, the
birthright levy would "reduce the correlation between birthright citizenship
and inequality of actual life opportunities" (p. 86).
The animating goal of Shachar's birthright levy proposal is to "ensure
freedom from want" (p. 96) in less-privileged countries. Shachar rightfully
notes that this would be "no small improvement" given that "almost a bil-
lion people are struggling just to survive" (p. 96). Although Shachar claims
to offer a "concrete legal response" (p. 104) to this problem, her birthright
levy discussion reads more like a nascent thought experiment than a well-
developed plan. Rather than flesh out one proposal for the birthright levy,
Shachar sketches multiple possibilities (pp. 96-110). In the end, she does
18. See infra Section i.B.
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not offer a workable blueprint, and the hazy contours of her proposal raise
concerns about the intellectual coherence of her arguments.
One of Shachar's more developed ideas about the birthright levy takes
the form of a public service mandate. She notes that "[t]his active, do-good
commitment may be implemented in various imaginative ways," including
"the creation of a Global Teaching Fellows Program, the Midwives Interna-
tional Volunteer Corps, or the Society of Engineers for a Safer World" (p.
100). Each of these "imaginative" proposals, however, appears to have a
fully realized analog in the status quo. How is the "Global Teaching Fellows
Program" any different from World Teach?'9 Does the "Midwives Interna-
tional Volunteer Corps" serve a different function than Doctors Without
Borders?20 Is the fictitious "Society of Engineers for a Safer World" distinct
from EngineerAid?" Shachar does not answer any of these questions. Given
that her project is meant to be both "novel" (p. 97) and "concrete," the lack
of guidance here is problematic. Shachar arguably offers some general di-
rection when she broadly frames the birthright levy proposal as a shift "from
the realm of charity or morality to that of legal obligation." 22 This small
clarification, however, only raises more questions: What authority would
enforce this birthright levy? Would any wealthy nation states willingly ac-
cede to this kind of obligation? Shachar acknowledges that states are likely
to remain the key players on the world stage (p. 104). Given this reality, how
could any government or organization raise the birthright privilege levy idea
in a meaningful way?
These uncertainties make it difficult to evaluate the desirability of the
birthright levy. Nonetheless, any incarnation of the birthright levy would
raise two serious structural concerns. First, imposing a worldwide manda-
tory birthright levy directly contradicts Shachar's discussion of life in a
vibrant liberal democracy as a valuable component of privileged citizen-
ship.23 Although Shachar does not acknowledge the tension between valuing
democratic choice among nation states and a mandatory global privilege
levy, it is difficult to imagine a scenario where any nation state would be in a
position to implement the birthright levy. Even if every nation state em-
braced the mandatory privilege levy, however, imposing a global mandatory
levy calls the legitimacy of the democratic process into question if the out-
come is a foregone conclusion. In short, Shachar's proposed remedies to the
supposed injustice of birthright citizenship are at odds with values like de-
19. See worldTeach, http://www.worldteach.org/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
20. See Doctors Without Borders, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/ (last visited Nov.
14, 2010).
21. See EngineerAid Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.engineeraid.com/faq.php (last
visited Nov. 14, 2010).
22. Pp. 100-01. This vague pronouncement is made even less clear by the fact that Shachar
characterized the birthright levy as a "moral responsibility toward those not so fortune [sic]," p.100
(emphasis added), just one page after describing it as a shift from "morality to that of legal obliga-
tion," p. 101. Although Shachar insists that the birthright levy is distinct from charity, she never
explains how or why.
23. See infra Section U.B.
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mocracy and sovereignty that she claims to embrace. Shachar's birthright
levy would transform the world system, but her claim that it represents a
"promising and concrete path toward a more just distribution of opportunity
globally" (p. 108) is supremely premature. As sketched out, Shachar's birth-
right levy raises many questions but provides few answers. Before heralding
the birthright levy as "concrete," Shachar should, at a minimum, offer more
details about the contours of her proposal and address its seeming contradic-
tions with her other lines of analysis.
B. Jus Nexi
Shachar's second proposed birthright citizenship remedy is jus nexi.
Unlike birthright citizenship, jus nexi considers "the actual conduct of the
person in the context of her social attachments and community ties"
(p. 178). Jus nexi offers an exciting contribution to the citizenship debate,
but its inherently subjective approach demands caution. Consequently,
Shachar's blanket endorsement of jus nexi irrespective of whether it sup-
plements or supplants birthright citizenship (pp. 165, 179, 188) is too
extreme.
Jus nexi offers a potentially powerful solution to "one of the most diffi-
cult dilemmas for liberal democracies: how to deal with noncitizen residents
whose initial entry breached the law of the admitting states" (p. 166). Under
jus nexi, formalistic solutions are rejected in favor of "trac[ing] the attach-
ment between the individual and the political community on the basis of
factual membership and affected interests" (p. 168). Thus, jus nexi could
pave the way toward legalization for illegal immigrants who have become
actively involved with their new communities. Shachar rightfully notes that
jus nexi's flexibility can further the goal of "democratic inclusion" (p. 178).
The wrong political environment, however, could easily deploy jus nexi
principles to further marginalize those in the shadows. Because jus nexi
"differs from a pure domicile-based principle of membership" (p. 179), it
invites value judgments about the nature and quality of an immigrant's ties
to the community. This creates the risk of depriving socially subordinated
individuals of a voice simply because of their status or because their politi-
cal affiliations are unpopular. In addition, it punishes the most vulnerable
people in a nation state--children, new immigrants, and those in refugee
camps-who may not yet have had the opportunity to meaningfully contrib-
ute to a polity but nonetheless consider it their home. As the ongoing
immigration debate makes clear, these are not hypothetical concerns.24
Jus nexi also runs the dual risk of being both too powerful and too weak.
If jus nexi were to supplant birthright citizenship, there is no logical reason
why these principles could not be applied to eject people from the country
of their birth if they were deemed to have insufficient ties to their home
24. See Birthright Citizenship Act of 2009, H.R. 1868, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing to
deny automatic birthright citizenship to children of illegal aliens); see also Jan C. Ting, "Other Than
a Chinaman": How US. Immigration Law Resulted Fmm and Still Reflects a Policy of Excluding
and Restricting Asian Immigration, 4 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 301 (1995).
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country." Most likely, these hapless individuals would join the ranks of the
nearly fifteen million stateless people, thereby exacerbating an already-
serious humanitarian crisis.26 Alternatively, jus nexi is problematic because it
is too weak of a tool to help those who need it most. Shachar's jus nexi solu-
tion is completely unresponsive to the plight of people who are too
vulnerable to leave their home country in search of a better life in a more
prosperous nation.
A predictable legal framework therefore provides a desirable check on
the unrestrained application of jus nexi. As American birthright jurispru-
dence demonstrates, birthright citizenship can empower the politically
unpopular and marginalized among us.2 Shachar is correct to note that
birthright citizenship is underinclusive (pp. 117-20); certainly, not all vul-
nerable people in a polity were born there. However, this is an argument for
supplementing birthright citizenship rather than rejecting it: birthright citi-
zenship provides a floor of protections, and jus nexi can add to it.
Shachar's jus nexi approach is an intriguing theoretical tool motivated
by the admirable desire to protect the most vulnerable among us. 28 Depend-
ing on the political context, however, those who need jus nexi's protection
the most may be the least likely to receive it. While Shachar is right to en-
dorse jus nexi as a supplement to birthright citizenship, her endorsement of
jus nexi in place of birthright citizenship is fundamentally flawed.
CONCLUSION
As Parts II and III of this Notice contend, Shachar's book contains nota-
ble shortcomings. She devotes substantial energy to developing an analogy
that does not quite work, and her proposed solutions to the birthright citi-
zenship do not provide a feasible alternative. Both Shachar's flawed foil and
her unworkable blueprints are, unfortunately, a sizable part of her book.
Although Parts II and 1H of this Notice criticize the way Shachar initi-
ated the discussion, it would be a mistake to conclude that the conversation
is not one worth having in the first place. As Part I argues, Shachar's indict-
ment of birthright citizenship is every bit as "iconoclastic" as she hoped, and
The Birthright Lottery therefore remains an important read. The question,
though, is for what purpose?
25. Shachar asserts rather dismissively that this won't happen, but she offers no elaboration
as to why. See p. 158. Given that this is the logical extension of her argument, an explanation might
have made her claims more convincing.
26. The world's 15 million stateless people need help, UNHCR (May 18, 2007),
http://www.unhcr.org/464dca3c4.html.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898); see also GARRETT Epps,
DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN
PosT-CIvIL WAR AMERICA 174-75 (2006); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 67-71 (1988); Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth




As discussed in the Introduction, Shachar's book reads like a hopeless
indictment of the American Dream. Once her problematic analogy and pro-
posed remedies are deemphasized, the reality is far less dire. As Shachar's
own discussion of citizenship makes clear, it is possible to exercise agency
within a birthright citizenship context. And although Shachar is correct to
note that we live in a world of scarcity, the well-developed network of inter-
national efforts29 makes birthright citizenship less of an all-or-nothing
proposition than Shachar suggests.
This is not to say that Shachar's call to redirect "our gaze from the im-
migrant to the citizen" (p. 7) does not implicate the American Dream. By
highlighting the privileged position that all Americans enjoy vis-A-vis the
rest of the world by virtue of their birth, Shachar makes clear that all Ameri-
cans enjoy a windfall. Ultimately, Shachar's book sensibly encourages
readers to challenge the premise of birthright citizenship rather than reject it
outright.
29. See supra Section llI.A.
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